Modeling the fiscal impacts caused by climate change by Kutasi, Gábor
Modeling the Fiscal Impacts Caused by Climate Change 
 
Gábor Kutasi 
assistant professor of Corvinus University of Budapest 
PhD of Economics 
The paper was sponsored by TÁMOP-4.2.1.B-09/1/KMR-2010-0005 
 
Paper was prepared for the 3rd Internat’l Scientific Conference: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMET, 2011 Ravda, 
Bulgaria, organized by Center on Sustainable Development, University of National and World Economy 
(UNWE), Sofia, Bulgaria 
 
Abstract 
Aim of the paper: The purpose is to gather the practices and to model the impacts of climate 
change on fiscal spending and revenues, responsibilities and opportunities, balance and debt 
related to climate change (CC).  
Methodology of the paper: The methodology will distinguish fiscal cost of mitigation and 
adaptation, besides direct and indirect costs. It will also introduce cost benefit analyses to 
evaluate the propensity of policy makers for action or passivity. Several scenarios will be 
drafted to see the different outcomes. The scenarios shall contain the possible losses in the 
natural and artificial environment and resources. Impacts on public budget are based on 
damage of income opportunities and capital/wealth/natural assets. There will be a list of 
actions when the fiscal correction of market failures will be necessary. 
Findings: There will be a summary and synthesis of estimation models on CC impacts on 
public finances, and morals of existing/existed budgeting practices on mitigation. The model 
will be based on damages (and maybe benefits) from CC, adjusted with probabilities of 
scenarios and policy making propensity for action. Findings will cover the way of funding of 
fiscal costs. 
Practical use, value added: From the synthesis of model, the fiscal cost of mitigation and 
adaptation can be estimated for any developed, emerging and developing countries. The paper 
will try to reply, also, for the challenge how to harmonize fiscal and developmental 
sustainability. 
Modeling the Fiscal Impacts Caused by Climate Change 
Gábor Kutasi1 
A forward-looking perspective is always useful in policymaking,  
and it is especially useful for fiscal planners. 
Peter S. Heller (2003:10) 
1. Introduction  
The Brundtland Report on sustainability of development issued in 1987 has early explained 
the responsibility of human activities for transition of natural environment. Peter S. Heller’s 
book, the ‘Who will pay?’ (Heller 2003) can be called one of the first mile stones in thinking 
about fiscal impacts of long-term processes of the 21st century global economy, as the climate 
change among others. Since the ‘Who will pay?’, the particular specified economics literature 
has been enlarging.  
This study overviews the public finances aspects of climate change. The sustainability is in 
focus, but this time the fiscal one and not the development aspect. The purpose is to gather the 
practices and to model the impacts of climate change on fiscal spending and revenues, 
responsibilities and opportunities, balance and debt related to climate change. 
The horizon of global problems and regional social changes in the 21st century demands more 
long-term, forward-looking awareness and planning from national governments. Heller (2003) 
named the demographic changes, the global climate change and the globalization as main 
channels of very long-term challenges. These processes open new dimensions, also, in fiscal 
planning by causing cost of anticipation, mitigation, adaptation or other way of treatment.    
In most of the industrialized countries, there are many factors ruining fiscal sustainability 
beside the climate change costs. The aging population, the welfare state reform, the recovery 
from global crisis, the tax competition, the rigidities of labour markets already have resulted 
robust debt levels. (The approximately debt to GDP ratios have been the followings in 2011: 
USA 100%, Japan 225%, France 80%, Germany 75%, Britain 70% etc. source: Eurostat) The 
determining debt level warns for an important constraint in the beginning: The fiscal cost of 
mitigation and adaptation can not be financed simply with public debt.  
It is preferable to examine the impacts of climate in the fiscal environment drafted above. 
Nevertheless, the climate change is an expected occurrence in the future of the 21st century, 
which depends on many factors. This uncertainty or probability creates a more complex 
challenge for fiscal strategy. The regional variability of extent of warming or frequency and 
intensity of extreme weather events (cyclones, hurricanes, storms) or importance of coastal 
rise in the sea level still increases the complexity of fiscal analysis.  
The mitigation and adaptation to climate change means any private or public action to prevent 
the change of temperature or adjust to a changed climate. Aaheim & Aasen (2008) distinguish 
autonomous and planned ways. The autonomous adaptation is the case, when private 
individuals do something for adjustment in uncoordinated way. This could have been a cheap 
way for public finances, but also results suboptimal solution because of bias for individual 
free riding, emergence of common pool resource problem, or uncertainty. That is why 
planned adjustment, namely fiscal adaptation is necessary, too, to motivate the private sector 
for (pro-)action. Nevertheless, the autonomous adjustment also has impact on tax revenues 
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and public transfers. E.g., energy saving means less pollution-related tax payment, or direct 
investments in renewable energy equipment can create right to get public subsidy.       
To adopt the debt sustainability aspect into the frame of climate change aspects, the long-term 
solvency, the budget constraint, the primary gap indicator has been applied. Besides 
indebtedness, refocusing fiscal spending and resetting the extent of public budget invoke the 
Keynesian fiscal crowding out impact. 
 
2. Methodology of climate change 
As a methodological simplification, the climate change can be translated as significant shift in 
average temperature, thus there is a variable or factor for calculations.2 The modeling of fiscal 
impacts shall be examined in the frame of temperature change causing damages or benefits, 
and cost of mitigation or adaptation. If climate change got realized globally, it does not mean 
a generally same extent of change of temperature in every region and territory of the Earth. (It 
is possible more or less warming in temperature or even cooling is a likely outcome in certain 
regions.) As warming may be so different, the physical impact can be various. In some region, 
the rise of sea might will take costal territories, in some region the hart illnesses might will 
rise by warmer climate, in other territories the agricultural lands will dry out, somewhere else 
the disappearance of ice and snow create land cultivation opportunities or ruin the winter 
tourism etc. But what is the likelihood in a continent, a country, a county or a city/village 
level? If there are more scenarios, what are the effective mitigation and adaptation actions? 
What is the critical mass or scale of action? Will the actors wait for each other to act? Who 
should act first? Should the state intervene, motivate, initiate? And so on. If such uncertain 
probabilities are accumulated (namely multiplied), finally the likelihood of effective actions 
can be low. (see fig. 1 and fig. 2) 
Figure 1. Increasing uncertainty in climate change (CC) 
 
Source: Simplified adaptation from Stern (2007) and O’Hara (2009) 
Heller (2003:19) refers to the IPCC (2001) projections on expectable change of temperature in 
100 years term horizon, which forecasts 1.9 – 5.8 Celsius (3 – 10 Fahrenheit) gradual 
warming by the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The uncertainty of 
temperature change can be illustrated in a fan chart of probable further future expectations.   
Besides high uncertainty, the economic actors should agree in the distribution of financing 
between public and private players. The economic motivation for participation can be 
established, if the participants can get at least so much benefit from mitigation and adaptation 
actions as much cost they invest. Nevertheless, there are private actors (or maybe even state 
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 The estimation of global and regional probability, extent and direction of temperature change is a natural 
science question, thus in public finances study, it will be treated as an external factor. 
actors in the international relations), who are not able to finance themselves the adaptation. 
Thus, the public decision makers must determine the extent of equity toward poor economic 
actors. (CEPS & ZEW 2010) This aspect raises the equity vs. efficiency trade-off dilemma, 
whether the fiscal resources should be used for subsidizing rich or poor actors (by direct 
spending or tax refunding). To resolve the dilemma, the economic theory knows the utilitarian 
approach and the Rawls approach. In case of climate change mitigation, the specific carbon 
emission per household of different social groups can guide the balancing between equity and 
efficiency. However, equity is not just a dilemma in social classes dimension, but in 
geographical view, too. Which are the populated and industrial areas deserving protection 
against higher sea level or other natural damages? See the bad practice case of New Orleans 
in 2005. How well developed hurricane warning system has it done worth to be financed? 
How big efforts and how quickly has it done worth to save people right after the catastrophe?  
Or see the Dutch agricultural lands under the sea level. How far should they be protected? Do 
these lands produce enough income to protect them from the sea?   
The policy making – in relation to market motivation – must decide another dilemma between 
short-term profit and long-term supply what can be called supply security dilemma. (CEPS & 
ZEW 2010) In which territories should the state sustain the supply of energy, food, 
transportation, safe water and sewage system, pipelines? The prices and the (in)elasticity of 
the (network) service markets, the intensity of destructive competition3, will decide the short-
term profit. When the profit is negative, the state may force the service companies to supply – 
or maybe not. 
In case of climate change, the likelihood of irreversibility is important determinant. Although 
an early mitigation action can look like unworthy because of high uncertainty and low 
probability of occurrence of damages far before the forecasted warming or disasters, an 
overdue mitigation can not reverse the natural, environmental changes. In this case, only 
adaptation remains as option. (CEPS & ZEW 2010) The economics of decision theory 
suppose to use the net present value (NPV) to choose the more worthy option. In climate 
change relation, the comparable options are the NPV of an earlier mitigation or the NPV of a 
later adaptation. 
To estimate the fiscal costs, the market capacity, propensity and perfection is preferable to be 
examined. It should be estimated, how far can the government levy the burden of adaptation 
on the private sector (solvency, marginal proactive propensity etc.), and can the market 
manage the risk to have demand and supply to meet and avoid the market failures. In climate 
disasters, first of all, the insurance sector should be helped to be able to manage the risk as far 
as possible.       
To treat the impacts of climate change, it is possible to mitigate, what – according to Heller 
(2003:25) – means much effort devoted to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.  
Here public sector involvement may involve replacing existing taxes with new ones that promote 
reduced emission. Or there may be more active use of regulation, whether of the command-and-
control or the market-based type […], in which case the fiscal consequences are likely to be more 
limited. Heller (2003:25) 
If mitigation is too late, or it is too expensive for preventing a not too likely event, the 
adaptation to new/changed circumstances can be another response. According to Heller 
(2003:23), the extent and cost of adaptation is regional or country specific, as it depends on 
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the intensity of climate change, the embodiment of environmental or geographic changes, and 
the side effects on economy and physical assets. Heller thinks the followings: 
Although much of the burden of relocating resources and financing new investment will 
undoubtedly fall on the private sector, it is unlikely that the public sector will remain unscathed, 
especially in countries, such as many developing countries, where the net economic impact of 
climate change is expected to negative. Areas of potential public sector involvement include 
outlays on infrastructure […], other public goods in the areas of disease prevention and 
agricultural extension and research […], and subsidies (to facilitate the resettlement of 
population). Heller (2003:23)    
As the significant warming is forecasted for century long, the public fiscal intervention is far 
more necessary in case of produced capital stocks, buildings, physical infrastructure with 
lifetime over 50. Especially, if unexpected or unlikely, radically destructive disasters or abrupt 
changes cause high scale of short-term cost.       
Figure 2. Example for uncertainty: does it worth to have protection against flood? 
 
Source: CEPS & ZEW (2010:55, fig.3.4) 
The methodology on surveying fiscal impacts by climate change distinguishes fiscal cost of 
mitigation and adaptation, besides direct and indirect costs. It also introduces cost benefit 
analyses to evaluate the propensity of policy makers for action or passivity. Scenarios shall be 
drafted to see the different outcomes. The scenarios shall contain the possible losses in the 
natural and artificial environment and resources. Impacts on public budget are based on 
damage of income opportunities and capital/wealth/natural assets. In the followings, there is a 
composed list of actions when the fiscal correction of market failures is be necessary. 
When fiscal cost of climate change is under survey, two main type of cost, the direct and the 
indirect costs can be distinguished. The direct costs are easily identifiable, however it is 
assumed to be smaller part of total costs. The difficulties with the identification of indirect 
costs alert for efficiency challenges, because the transparency of total cost of adaptation gets 
deteriorated. If costs are not transparent, economic participants will not be willing to finance 
it or support it, thus, the absent funding ruins the efficiency of any actions. The mechanism of 
direct and indirect costs can be described by the model on drivers of fiscal impacts.    
 
 
3. Modeling the impacts 
In the model on drivers, the CEPS & ZEW (2010) gathered the fiscal implication of climate 
change and identified six drivers that determine the size and importance of the fiscal 
implications. These are the followings: (1) the degree of exposure to gradual and extreme 
climate events; (2) the level of protection already in place in areas at risk, i.e. preparedness; 
(3) the state’s liability for damages; (4) the potential and impacts of autonomous adaptation 
and remedial actions; (5) the cross-border effects of climate change; and (6) the fiscal 
capacity of the member states and the role of the EU. 
The mechanism of drivers is illustrated in Figure 3, below. Direct fiscal costs are the 
construction and maintenance of protective infrastructures, the additional maintenance of 
public infrastructures affected by climate change, the changes in social expenditures mainly 
from potential repercussions on employment or alterations in health expenditures. A certain 
type of direct “cost” can be the revenue changes of the budget because of shifts in the 
economic and trade structure or in the consumption. The indirect fiscal costs appears as 
impacts on fiscal capacity to deal with very long-term challenges, like climate change, by 
definition of CEPS & ZEW (2010:52). 
Figure 3. Drivers of impacts, various national concerns 
 
Source: CEPS & ZEW (2010:52, Fig.3.2) 
The degree of exposure means the above mentioned region-specific characteristics related to 
local geography, climate and location in climatic belt. (E.g. average temperature, rainfall, 
coastal facilities etc.) The level of protection means the existing infrastructure for protecting 
or monitoring and early warning systems against natural disasters endangering lives and 
economic values, extreme weather conditions endangering human health. High level of 
existing protection saves a lot of investments for the budgets in the future. However, it has 
been meaning a high level of permanent operating cost to keep the condition of systems and 
edifices. Early mitigating investments and intensive technological developments can reduce 
such type of cost factors. State liabilities for damages are any type of promise of state or 
expectable aid and help from the state which are paid or financed for victims of natural 
catastrophes, or financing the natural disaster relief. To reduce the scale of such liabilities, 
sophisticated and well developed private insurance sector is necessary, and thus the public 
support for its development is recommended.  
Autonomous adaptation as driver of fiscal impacts represents the cooperative, initiative and 
supportive propensity of the private sector individuals. The actual occurrence of autonomous 
adaptation is the result of private utility-maximization objectives and their assessment of 
risks.  The cross-border effects as impact drivers include two types of cost factors. One is the 
residual costs from actions in another country, the other type is the aid transfers for 
developing countries to adapt to climate change, or technology transfer to mitigate. Fiscal 
capacity as determinant of scale of spending for mitigation and adaptation shall be understood 
in dynamic approach. Not only the given balance of revenues and expenditure matters, but the 
potential changes of them do, too. This is called fiscal flexibility what means the taxation and 
spending room for maneuver of the fiscal government, the realizable potential scale of change 
of tax burden and expenditure by discretionary decisions. Standard & Poor’s rating agency 
has even developed an indicator, the Fiscal Flexibility Index with sub-indices such as 
Expenditure Flexibility Index and Revenue Flexibility Index. (See Standard & Poor’s 2007a 
and Standard & Poor’s 2007b.) The fiscal flexibility can be extended through – first of all – 
the minimized indebtedness, the economic growth friendly economic policy and the lower 
scale of public finances, namely, lower total tax burden and public spending intensity with 
same balance. (Benczes & Kutasi 2010:95)    
Generally, the cost impact of the drivers can be reduced by technological (R&D) investments, 
supranational provision and assistance, internationally integrated financial and technological 
resources, expansion of insurance market, regulation of land and water use, information 
provision for awareness, direct fiscal incentives to help individual actors for autonomous 
mitigation, review of state liabilities. (CEPS & ZEW 2010:59-62)  
As mentioned above, fiscal impacts can be derived from the economic impacts which are 
preferable to be anticipated by the economic actors. Such general impacts are the average 
temperature in the seasons, along with an expected rise in temperature extremes; precipitation 
patterns; snow cover; water systems – particularly river flows (flood and drought risks) and 
groundwater levels; and coastal regions – with sea level rise and flood risks.  
The following economic and natural impacts are expectable, what might demand autonomous 
and/or planned adaptation. (UNFCCC 2007, World Bank 2009, Fischer et al. 2007, Bosello et 
al. 2009, Bräuer et al. 2009)  
- In the agriculture, change in cultivation to more thermophile plants, redesigning drainage 
systems, building and reconstruction droughts, rethinking short land tenancy period, earlier 
seeding, potentially an additional crop rotation, expanding variety of crops and plants, 
developing of new crop types, increased use of fertilization and plant protection; water-saving 
cultivation; development of plant and animal disease and pest monitoring; new insurance 
regulation;  
- In the forestry, the needful actions: control of pests and diseases; enhance resistance of 
forest by mixed stands; earlier evacuation of trees after pests damage; forest fire and related 
monitoring system; rapid harvesting after wind damages; forest transformation to higher 
diversification of tree types;  
- In health sector, the heat stress, vector-born diseases, increasing use of the health service 
capacity. 
- Water related factors are the floods, heavy rains, coastal sea level, droughts, ice accidents, 
fertilizer in water reservoirs.  
- Tourism related impacts: less snow for winter sport, algal blooms, sea level, hotter or longer 
summer periods. 
- Energy sector related impacts are less heating, more cooling, unreliable water transport, 
limited water cooling, better temperature for biomass, increase in precipitation, power cable 
damages, changes in wind velocity, research demand. 
- Transportation related impacts: drainage, resisting capability of infrastructure, risk of 
accidents by hot weather, erosion and flood damages, shorter ice and snow period, dried 
canals.       
According to CEPS & ZEW (2010) the following type of fiscal cost impacts can be derived 
from the economic and natural impacts of climate change: 
- Incentives for innovation and technological development 
- Agricultural subsidies for guiding to new climate, and compensation for loss of agri-
lands by desertification or higher sea level. 
- Relocation of infrastructure in coastal areas and building protective infrastructure (e.g. 
dykes) 
- Restructuring tourism and energy sector and related transportation systems 
- Compensation for lost real estates taken by the sea or nationalized territories for 
relocated infrastructure 
- Adaptation cost of public buildings  
- Cost of monitoring and providing early warning information 
- Cost of health problems caused by changed climate 
- Restructuring of employment 
- Damages by natural disasters 
- Compensation of poor part of society 
The tax impacts can realize in the tax revenues depending on income and energy 
consumption. The transparency of carbon pricing in taxation will also determine the energy 
consumption propensity, thus the energy related tax revenues. 
 
4. Climate change as one of the fiscal sustainability factors 
As it was written by Heller (2003), the public finances are challenged by long-term structural 
problems like aging population, sharp increase of population in emerging and the least 
developed countries, health and disease problems, technological change, globalization of 
capital, labour and consumer markets, and of course last but not least the climate change. 
Before mentioning any practical issues of public financing, there is a theoretical frame what 
must be taken into any account. Namely, sooner or later any public expenditure must be 
covered, otherwise debt crisis is expectable. To avoid the default, budget constraint is guiding 
principle, which means that the present value of future expenditures and revenues and the 
liabilities accumulated in the past should be in balance. (Benczes and Kutasi 2010) 
PV (debt + future expenditures) = PV(future revenues) 
If the budget constraint is continued through the findings of Fatás et al. (2003), Grauwe 
(2000), Buiter and Grafe (2004), Chalk and Hemming (2000), the affordable deficit can be 
concluded from the budget constraint: 
∆b = g – τ + (r–n)b – m, 
where ∆b is the change of debt in % of GDP (namely, the budget balance), g is the public 
sending in % of GDP, τ is the tax revenue in % of GDP, r is the real interest rate, n is the 
growth rate of GDP, b is the debt to GDP ratio, and m is the seigniorage revenue. This 
constraint still can be fined with overlapping generation aspects (see Zee 1988) and with 
crowding out impact (see Tobin and Buiter 1976, Bagnai 2004). 
To evaluate the fiscal room for maneuver – e.g. before raising the green spending, – there is 
opportunity to form sustainability indicators from the budget constraint. A generally used one 
is the primary gap indicator by Blanchard (1990). 
d = (nt – rt)*bt  
and 
d – dt  = (nt – rt)*bt – dt     
where d is the primary deficit, dt is the realized general budget deficit, , r is the real interest 
rate, n is the growth rate of GDP, t is a given year. If d < dt , there is excessive budget deficit 
which destabilize the public financing. Real interest rate is calculated from the Fisher 
equation: 
1 + i  = (1 + r) * (1 + pi),   
where i is the nominal interest rate, pi is inflation.  
r = [(1+ i) / (1 + pi)] – 1 
Figure 4. Primary gap in G7 countries, 2010, %  
 
Source: IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/13 (Long-Term Trends in Public Finances in the G-7 
Economies) Fig. 7.,  p. 14, based on IMF Fiscal Monitor May 2010, IMF World Economic Outlook 
July 2010 Update, and IMF staff calculations and estimates. 
* The primary gap is the difference between the primary balance for 2011 that is needed to maintain the 2010 
debt-to-GDP ratio and the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) in 2010. 
** The scenario assumes that the CAPB improves gradually from 2011 to 2020; thereafter, the CAPB is 
maintained constant until 2030. The CAPB path is set to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to 60 percent by 2030. For 
Japan, a gross debt target of 200 percent of GDP (net target of 80 percent of GDP) is assumed. The scenario uses 
country-specific interest rate–growth differentials. 
 
As it is clear from the crude data of figure 5, and the primary gap indicator in figure 4, most 
of the high developed countries have trouble with the general budget balance. Besides, the 
primary gap indicator even represents a longer term fiscal adjustment period necessity for 
these countries. Especially the big key economies (USA, Japan, Germany, France, UK) must 
face to drastic return to balance during decades after many years of fiscal stimuli. The global 
crisis of 2008-2010 caused a serious turmoil in many EU states’ public finances. Only six EU 
countries could keep the deficit criterion in 2009 (see graph 1.), four of them (Sweden, 
Denmark, Estonia, Bulgaria) have not introduced the euro. The other countries have diverged 
both in debt and deficit. Since 2010, during one and a half year many euro zone countries had 
difficulties in debt financing (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain). Some euro zone members 
also have got closer to non-credible indebtedness (Italy, France). In USA, the solvency gets 
also questionable in the middle of 2011 because of political disputes on debt ceiling. Big 
countries budgetary troubles spill over to their economies and to partner economies, thus 
causing them fiscal troubles, too. Such a global situation is not favourable for quick fiscal 
adjustment to the challenge by climate change.   
Figure 5. Fiscal sustainability problem of EU and USA. Fiscal impact of crisis on debt 
(vertical axis) and deficit (horizontal axis) in 2009, % of GDP 
 
Source: Eurostat 
In case of a new type of spending forced by external natural factors, just like the prevention or 
damages from climate change, the sustainability question can be composed also as a dilemma 
of hard or soft budget constraint. Hard constraint means budget balance beside restructuring 
of expenditures or tax revenues increasing together with spending. Soft constraint means 
unilateral rise of spending what results higher overall deficit. (Kopits 2000) The hard 
constraint is not attractive for political deals. The soft constraint causes increasing default 
risk. If sustainability is a primary objective, soft budget constraint is not an option, however 
political deals can frequently overwrite the economic rationale.4 
Besides, any case of increasing scale of public budget, also because of green spending or 
taxes, raises another policy dilemma. Namely, does it worth to strengthen the fiscal crowding 
out impact? (Tobin & Buiter 1976) The increasing spending (indifferent whether form tax 
revenues or debt) results higher market interest rate as cost of credit. The increasing public 
spending turns the private investments and consumption to be declining. This crowding out 
impact will be important, also, to explain why the private sector becomes more and more 
passive in mitigation and adjustment when high government activity is observable. So not 
only free riding is behind the passivity of the private sector, but crowding out can be another 
explaining factor. The extent of any crowding out will be determined by the elasticity of 
money demand, the capital income to total income ratio, the wealth to out-put ratio, the level 
of taxation and interest rate and the speed of growth. 
 
5. Fiscal policy dilemmas related to climate change 
Through the recognition of indebtedness of highly developed (and climate sensitive) 
countries, the climate dilemmas of public finances can be worded. The first dilemma is the 
following: As there is no satisfying room for issuing more debt to cover the fiscal climate 
adaptation, the two options for fiscal policy are the redistribution among the items of taxes 
and spending or levy as much cost as possible on the private sector through perfect markets, 
like a sophisticated insurance sector. However, the two horns of the dilemma demand 
challenging balancing. If the private sector with limited time horizon got no fiscal (public) 
impulse at all, the private perception on net present value of adaptation will be considered to 
be negative, as individuals of the private sector can not optimize for the endless future, or 
more then a few generation. (See the paradox of Ricardian equivalence.5) In the contrary case, 
getting excessive fiscal subsidies, the community of individuals of the private sector will 
expect any adaptation from the state, thus remain passive. 
The second dilemma rooted also in the limited room for issuing debt. The fiscal decision 
makers are forced by indebtedness to select among private actors, and create preference lists. 
Who should be compensated for damages, and who not? If rising sea level swallows coastal 
real estates, should the owners get subsidies, and how much? If productivity of agricultural 
lands were ruined by desertification, should the state bother with ensuring alternative income 
for rural workers and entrepreneurs? Should the ski parks get public or EU subsidies for snow 
guns if climate warming means too high temperature for snowing? etc. 
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 In the economics models, it is a reasonable assumption, that the states as actors are immortal, so they should be 
considered as infinite ones. That is why, the Ricardian equivalence can presume, that it is indifferent for the state 
to finance a new item of spending either from raising tax or from public debt. If it was true, this aspect gives 
opportunity for infinite Ponzi game for states, and just always accumulate higher and higher debt by promising 
higher and higher future tax revenues. However, O’Conell & Zeldes (1988) and also Buiter (2004) emphasized, 
that it is not possible because of the finite or limited horizon of individual households as buyer of public bonds. 
As the buyers are thinking in finite future and they are in limited number, the assumption of public bonds with 
infinite maturity is unrealistic. Besides, the imperfection of capital markets can not treat perfectly the uncertainty 
of the future. That is why it is expectable from the state to pay all the debts in the unseen future, namely what is 
expressed in the form of  
PV (debt + future expenditures) = PV(future revenues). 
The increasing green tax burden, bond issue and funding for mitigation and adaptation raises 
the dilemma whether does it worth to increase the fiscal crowding-out effect in the capital 
markets or not. This effect is very regional market specific because of the interest rate 
elasticity and marginal propensity of saving and investment. Of course, less investment can 
mean less carbon emitting production growth, but also slower technological development in 
carbon reduction, too.   
Heller (2003:120-150) recommends conceptual aspects for long-term fiscal planning to 
finance long term mitigation and adaptation to any sustainability problem. Certain aspects are 
the limits or “stop sign” for certain ways of adaptation. First of all, the public financing has 
social welfare function, namely, the support for more vulnerable groups in the society. The 
climate change enlightens, too, that decisions makers should take into account the interest of 
the future generations as one of the most vulnerable group. Thus, the aims of policy making 
shall contain the objective of achieving fairness across generations, what means excluding 
Ponzi games6 in budgeting, counter-weighting short-term political interest and eventually a 
kind of self-limitation in long-term borrowing for financing current outlays. The necessity of 
self-limitation rotted in the political economy recognition that there are individual interests 
behind the decisions, the principal-agent problem is an existing occurrence in public policy, 
and short-term interests are overweight, long-term interests are underscored in discretionary 
decisions. Institutional solutions, like fiscal rules, fiscal councils can improve the 
transparency and suppress political myopia, thus, treat the political obstacles.  
Besides, the government must be able to assess correctly and ensure the financial 
sustainability, namely, the long-term public solvency. Sustainability means not only focusing 
on budget balance, but also, the sustainability of the tax burden, the adequate risk 
management on fiscal threats and weaknesses, the sustainable institutional mechanisms to 
ensure the far future balance, and the limitation on future policy makers’ discretionary 
decisions. The decision makers must preserve the scope for stabilization measures, even 
though they prefer to use the fiscal policy as an instrument for having influence on the 
economy. The efficiency of allocation for Pareto efficient income production means 
practically the elimination of distorting effects in tax system, the distribution of spending in 
optimal structure referring to the equity vs. efficiency trade-off, and the suppression on red 
tape concerning the public finances. Of course, not just the present, but the legacy of fiscal 
policy will disperse the position of countries or regions. Simply, the fiscal legacy can be 
expressed in the current scale of public debt. And not only the extent of debt, but its structure 
will matter, since in dynamic view, it can be the root of suddenly intensifying side effects. For 
example, indebtedness in foreign currency can modify significantly the solvency of debtors in 
a foreign exchange rate shock without short term risk management instruments. (Such impacts 
are called nonlinearities by Heller (2003:149).) 
According to Heller (2003), state must be ready to anticipate market reactions driven by short-
sighted interest. Private sector’s propensity for funding or resource saving can determine 
crucially the effectiveness and scope of public policy actions for adaptation. The governments 
must think about market side effects of the structure of realizing the long-term sustainability. 
Will the market help or weaken certain stimulating or restricting actions? What will be, for 
example, the effect of lower or higher risk premium on private savings and investments? E.g., 
it is well known about debt crisis impacts, that when the direct danger of collapse get milder 
the private interest groups get less devoted to public finances reforms, so, the politicians will 
ease the previous restrictions and deteriorate the previously improved fiscal balance or 
balancing program. 
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 About Ponzi game in budgeting see more in Buiter & Kletzer (1992) 
The items mentioned in the followings and serving the green adaptation causes structural 
changes in public finances. This aspect supposes to treat the green reform, also, as a structural 
fiscal reform together with balancing. The simplest way to move toward fiscal balance is, 
when the incomes grow faster than the expenditures in absolute share. Thus, at once, the 
collapse of economic growth dynamics can be avoided. 
That means, the absolute growth of tax burden should be lower than the GDP-growth, and 
comparing even to tax increase, the growth of public expenditures should be much lower. 
However, this demands the public green spending not to be automatic, because the rigid 
expenditure types insensitive for business cycles will make the adjustment of spending 
unmanageable to the governmental solvency. Nevertheless, the tax incomes can not be 
decreased until the expenditures will not decline at least in the same scale. Besides, the 
expansion possibility of state debt means also limit in the play of tax reduction. (Tomkiewitz 
2005) 
The green reform basically is making an attempt to increase the net present value achievable 
through the fiscal policy, explained with the instruments of cost-benefit analysis is the 
following: 
max PV {benefit of society – cost of society} 
However, this cost-benefit analysis is fairly complex, that is why the results must be treated 
carefully to avoid misleading understandings. First of all, it is hard to measure any side effects 
of public expenditures and absorption. During the estimation of benefits the experts must face 
the comparison problem, how commensurable are the individuals’ subjective utility. 
Wildawsky (1997) guess, the appraisal methods used in practice are very uncertain – at least 
in case of public services. The net present value calculation is uncertain in dynamics, as the 
costs can vary in the future. (Kutasi 2006) 
The structural green reform of public finances is not simple corner-cutting or spare of 
expenditure targets. Any kind of efficiency-seeking restructuring related to revenues or 
expenditures can be mentioned under this category that will have a positive long-term impact 
for years or decades. In certain circumstances, the previous level of expenditures can be held. 
The essence of reform of public finances is, that the previous financing mechanisms get 
changed or reorganized to create more efficient structure independently form the current 
budget deficit or surplus. 
In Drazen’s (1998) approach, the fiscal reform is a common pool. Everyone consider this 
common pool to be made, but everyone wants it to be financed by others. This way, the 
possible utility created by a possible reform for everyone is in vain if there is high probability 
for burdening the cost on the certain individuals. This will be a ‘war of attrition’ impact on the 
reform, as most of the individuals will not support it. Moreover, the distribution of costs 
means actually a dispute on distribution of tax burden in the planning stage of restructuring, 
what will impede more the execution. Besides, the support of reform will be ruined much 
more in case of uncertainty of individual benefits. Many researches were made to find relation 
between the success of reform execution and the political institutional system. (see e.g. 
Strauch & von Hagen 2000, von Hagen, Hughes-Hallett & Strauch 2002, Alesina & Perotti 
1999, Poterba & von Hagen 1999, Benczes 2004, Benczes 2008 etc.) These surveys 
concluded that mostly the plurality of decision makers, the pressure for consensus or the 
multi-party government usually weaken the fiscal discipline as well the not transparent 
budgeting procedures or the strong bargaining power of spending ministers against financial 
minister. Although, the political and multi-party system can not be question of restructuring, 
making efforts for transparency of budgeting procedure and dealing can do a lot for 
disciplined public finances. (Kutasi 2006) 
    
6. Fiscal risk management of climate change 
The general risk management of sustainable budgeting has broad range of instruments with 
many experience of practical implementation. The fiscal rules have became often used since 
the 1990s. (See Kopits 2001, Kopits & Symansky 1998, Kumar et al. 2009, Benczes 2008, 
Benczes & Kutasi 2010:122-144) The different types of rules are the balanced budget rule7, 
the public debt rule8, the golden rule9, the expenditure rule10. These rules are useful to restrict 
the short-sighted political decision makers in discretionary decision enforcement. 
Besides rules, revising bodies can be established, which are typically called fiscal councils or 
fiscal boards with right to publish opinion, or, maybe, to veto on fiscal related decisions. 
Numerous example can be mentioned: the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Dutch Budget 
Inspectorate, Budget Directorate (Blöndal & Kristensen 2002) and Centraal Planbureau 
(Debets 2007), the Belgian federal High Council of Finance (Buti et al. 2002, Stienlet 2000) , 
the Spanish Consejo de Politica Fiscal y Financiera Financial (Quintana & Torrecillas 2008) 
the German Finanzplanungsrat (Lübke 2005), the Portuguese Program Financing Committee 
and the Unidade Técnica de Apoio Orçamental, the British Office for Budget Responsibility 
etc.  
In financing the very long-term impacts, just like the adaptation to climate change, the 
efficient solution for smooth, gradual accumulation is the fiscal funding (if the private 
insurance services can not create opportunity to shift the cost toward the private sector). Its 
weakness is that mostly those countries can easily establish such funds who have any way 
fiscal surplus typically from natural resource (oil) export. Such row material export based 
funds are e.g. the Norwegian and Russian oil funds for future pensions. Nevertheless, some 
member states of USA has also stability funds, or Australia has the Future Fund for public 
and military officers pension, the Higher Education Endowment Fund for college and 
university infrastructure development etc. (Blöndal et al. 2008)   
The funding specified for climate change is called financing by green funding. In national 
level, it would be possible to select a certain type of fiscal revenue (just like the oil exporting 
countries do with oil trade revenues), and indicate it as a source of a fund. In high developed 
countries, year by year, there are specified items in the annual budget for subsidizing the 
modernization of carbon emission related technologies. But such spending frames are result of 
discretionary annual decisions made by the current government. This does not ensure the 
long-term financing of mitigation and adaptation. An automatic fund could not only ensure 
the current scale of subsidy, but also the security of long-term financing by accumulating the 
revenues.11 Unfortunately, as it was already mentioned, the public budget has other long-term 
challenges related to demography, demanding funding for the future.  
Especially in the developing countries, the national accumulation of green fund has no source. 
Besides, eventually the climate change is a global problem, so national, unilateral adaptation 
does not seem to be the most efficient. Alternative option is the international funding, where 
national budgets contribute as their quota prescribes. Its advantages are cooperation of low 
income and high income countries, and the stronger governmental commitment to the long-
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 Limitation on general government balance or primary balance.  
8
 Limitation on public debt level. 
9
 Debt financing is allowed only in case of public capital investment, infrastructure investment.    
10
 Limitation on overall spending scale. 
11
 Of course, ultimately the law-makers can reintegrate any fund back to the annual budget, if that is the will of 
the significant political majority. So national level green funding is neither the absolute solution for financing the 
long-term objectives.  
term objective as giving up an international membership has more transaction cost (diplomacy 
damage) for a country than splitting a national fund. International green fund can be a mixture 
of national quotas, green tax revenue as direct income of the fund and market bonds financed 
by Sovereign Wealth Funds and other private investors. (See Fig.6.)  
Such operating fund is the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) in the 
CARICOM, described by IMF (2008:31). CCRIF is multi-country risk pool and also insurance 
instrument backed by both public finances and capital markets. It was set to help CARICOM 
countries mitigate the short-term cash flow problems in disaster situations.  It is a regional 
catastrophe fund for Caribbean governments, CCRIF operates as a public-private partnership, and 
is set up as a non-profit ‘mutual’ insurance entity. The CCRIF pays out in the event of 
parametric trigger points being exceeded. It provides rapid payment if disaster strikes. The 
CCRIF has coverage for hurricane, earthquake and excess rainfall. The facility is a fund 
operating particularly like insurance. There is plan to involve the agricultural sector and the 
energy companies.12 
Figure 6. Financing by green funding 
  
 
Source: Bredenkamp & Pattillo (2010:10) 
Similar international green fund is in the period of formation. According to the Copenhagen 
Accord issued at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, 
international Green Fund shall be ready in 2020 to ensure financial aid for developing 
countries. The design of the exact financing is illustrated by Figure 6. (Bredenkamp & Pattillo 
2010) It seems, it is possible to capitalize a climate change adaptation from the private sector. 
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 For more see www.ccrif.org 
The international Green Fund will stand on private and public pillars. The public pillar is 
composed from national contribution quotas, national carbon tax incomes and national 
revenue from CO2 quota trade. The private pillar means issuing market bonds for private 
investors.  
However, any public funding raises the dilemma of crowding-out mentioned above, as the 
CCRIF and Green Fund backed by states pumps the financial resources from private 
investments. Moreover, as a general international aiding problem, appearing also in critics on 
ODA (Official Development Aid) operation, that international organizations (funds) are not 
able to achieve critical mass of capital to swing off the developing countries from the problem 
of undercapitalized position blocking the efficient risk management. The credibility of such 
funds will be decided on its operation, the effective commitment of the members and the 
realized results. 
To share the financing between public and private actors, namely planned and autonomous 
adaptation, beside the funding, there is an other item have been already mentioned in this 
paper, the insurance. However, simply private insurance is not enough to have efficient 
mitigation or adaptation. Phaup & Kirschner (2010) assume that public risk management is 
more efficient than individual, especially if it is preventive. On the other hand, it can become 
very expansive for the state, if private sector individuals see that they can get every protection 
from the state. The only state financed actions are called ex post budgeting, as it does not 
motivate the individuals to be preventive. That is why the optimum is the ex ante budgeting 
which accumulate reserves for the cost of catastrophe in the future, both from tax revenue and 
private income. The following options can be combined in the insurance sector for ex ante 
budgeting:  
(1) The state makes market transactions by purchasing insurance service from insurance 
companies. Its advantage is that government can secure insurance for anything considered to 
be necessary. The disadvantage is that the insurance sector may will not be able to pay the 
compensation for all the damages.  
(2) The state prescribes mandated purchase of insurance for the private asset owners. The 
advantage will be that the market will evaluate every object to be or not to be worthy for 
insurance. The disadvantage is that the private risk premium is very likely higher than the 
public risk premium. 
(3) The government-provided insurance means that the state establish a state insurance 
company, e.g. New Zealand Earthquake Commission. In this case, the state can control the 
whole process of insurance, but the possibility of political intervention is very likely, that is 
why the efficiency of this option is questionable. 
(4) Contingency Fund is the forth option, which is actually the government saving fund or 
green fund mentioned above. 
Johns & Keen (2009) based their recommendations on situation of broadly afflicting heavy 
indebtedness and high deficit problems. They suppose to charge the CO2 emission with green 
tax to mitigate the warming and to avoid the higher deficit. Of course, introduction of a green 
tax has many side effects. If it hits the emission target, and CO2 pollution decreases, the tax 
revenue on CO2 scale will also decrease. If the green tax automatically increases the tax 
burden (tax wedge) on the economy, it can have the economic growth to slow down. 
To manage the growth risk of crowding out and to cope with the crisis and recession of 2008, 
Jones & Keen (2009) proposed “green recovery”, namely state investment into green energy 
sector and CO2 saving technologies. Anyway, because of recovery, governments have been 
spending on stimulus packages. Such green stimuli could serve both the objectives of 
recovery and the mitigation through the multiplying impact of fiscal spending. This green 
recovery can be associated with employment objectives which are especially a sensitive field 
of economic policy, nevertheless in USA where the after crisis 2008 level of unemployment 
got up to 9.5-10%. Bossier & Bréchet (1995) has already recommended in the middle of 
1990s that carbon tax can be connected to the cost problems of employment in Europe. As 
much scale of green tax burden would have been levied on the economy, so much scale of 
social contribution (or any other labour-related employer cost) should be eased by labour tax 
cut. 
Even though it sounds simple, many side effects must be taken into account. How does the 
carbon emission tax raise the price of energy and fuels? If CO2 emission decreases, it means 
lower tax base, thus lower tax revenue. How to sustain the financing of social service systems 
if social contribution (health and pension contribution) has got decreased? Would labour tax 
really an incentive for more employment for companies? Is the tax cut critically enough to be 
effectively cheaper than foreign rivals? If companies do not see more demand, a tax cut will 
not motivate to hire more workers. Bossier & Bréchet (1995) warned for the risk of 
uncertainty and the necessity for simulation before policy actions. For example the E3ME 
(energy-environment-economy model of EU) by Barker (1998) was an econometric attempt to 
simulate effect of carbon tax on emission, GDP, competitiveness and employment. 
There is a good practice on green tax reform combined with employment objectives in 
Germany. The Gesetz zum Einstieg in die ökologische Steuerreform (Act on entry into the 
ecological tax reform) got into power in 1999. Green tax was levied on primary energy 
consumption, parallel with it, the employers labour-related tax was cut. (Bach et al. 2002) 
Kohlhaas (2005) created ex post and ex ante model to estimate the GDP and employment 
effect of German green tax reform. Table 1 shows the results. The German green employment 
shows effective characteristics, as during the global crisis and recession the German 
unemployment could have decreased from 10% to 6%.  
Figure 7. Scale of emission (left axis, 1000 tons/year) and employment (right axis, 1000 
persons) in Germany, France, United Kingdom. 
400 000
500 000
600 000
700 000
800 000
900 000
1 000 000
1 100 000
1 200 000
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
40 000
German CO2 emission French CO2 emission UK CO2 emission
German employment French employment UK employment
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Annual change in emission, employment and GDP as impact of German ecological 
tax reform, % 
Change in 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2010f 
CO2 emission -0.55 -1.33 -1.75 -1.95 -2.39 -2.47 -2.61 -3.1 
Employment  0.64 0.76 0.67 0.41 0.76 0.63 0.52 0.46 
GDP 0.39 0.47 0.44 0.29 0.45 0.38 0.3 0.13 
Source: Kohlhaas (2005:13, Tabelle 3-1) 
 
7. Conclusions 
It can be established, that climate change has introduced a new aspect into the structure of 
public finances both in expenditure and in revenue side. The exact fiscal impact in a given 
country is very uncertain since neither the exact regional natural impact is unsure, nor the 
unilateral national/regional mitigation could be enough and efficient without global 
cooperation. The fiscal impacts can be mapped by calculating with direct spending related to 
damages caused by climate change, and with indirect impacts in revenues and new 
expenditure themes caused through climate impacts on the economic growth, health 
condition, social relations and energy demand. 
It is clear, that the multi-year fiscal stimuli to anticipate the global crisis started in 2008 
created unfavourable fiscal rigidity for new types of spending, like climate change related 
mitigation and adaptation. It is not an easy task to enforce the political decision makers to 
prefer a 50-100 year-long problem to their short term interest related to political cycles, either. 
However, there are good practices how to build-in automatisms into the budget by funding, 
how to keep the balanced budget by restructuring of spending and tax systems, how to involve 
the private (autonomous) financial resources through insurance and funding. The government 
must find the optimum distribution of adaptation cost between public (planned) and private 
(autonomous) adapting actors and the adequate structure of incentives to motivate the private 
individuals for cooperation and participation in mitigation and adaptation to climate change.   
The efficient policy should treat with the factors or drivers of climate change cost, just like the 
degree of exposure to gradual and extreme climate events, the level of existing protection, the 
state’s liability for damages, the potential and impacts of autonomous adaptation, the cross-
border effects, and the fiscal capacity. 
The public budget must be the reserve for mitigation with complex structure. Either 
infrastructural or social or health or industrial or employment etc. aspects can connect to the 
climate problem. It is not simple to introduce any fiscal item or action for mitigation and 
adaptation since fiscal crowding-out and multiplier effects must be simulated on savings, 
investments, carbon emission, economic growth, competitiveness, external balance and 
employment. The simulation in the same time means testing the policy risk, namely the 
potential failure of green budget reform, and the political risk, namely loosing the next 
elections because unwanted side effects.   
The ideal fiscal policy affected by climate change would be a green stimulus combining 
spending and green tax, meanwhile keeping the scale and balance of the budget, but 
restructuring the fiscal preferences, thus, cutting the wage related cost of employment and 
improving the international competitiveness of the national economy.  
As climate change is global problem, international/global cooperation is likely to be the most 
efficient also in fiscal aspect. International cooperation can give solution for risk distribution, 
low income insolvency, credible funding with private investors, technological cooperation 
and access to knowledge, efficiency of early warning and reserving sustainable national 
budgets, all together.   
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